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ANATOMY OF FOREIGN AID TO ETHIOPIA: 19602003

Adugna Lemi*

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to present a portrait of the foreign aid flow to Ethiopia during the
1960 to 2003 period. Since the launch of Marshal Plan after World War II, the flow of foreign
aid has been seen as the panacea to overcome underdevelopment. Ethiopia is not an exception
to this view, and Ethiopia is one of the recipients of foreign aid not only to provide emergency
relief but also to support longterm economic development. This study shows the flow of aid to
Ethiopia in terms of major donors (bilateral and multilateral), method of delivery, and major
recipient sectors/purposes. The study attempts to answer the following questions: Which are
the major donor countries? For what purposes has the aid been given? For which sectors has
the country been receiving aid? Further, during the study period the country has twice
experienced changes in government. How have the composition, donors, and purposes of aid
changed with the changes of government? The paper attempts to present aid flows for the
country’s three government regimes. The study will use detailed aid data collected from donors
by the OECD and recently made available. This study does not attempt to link the flow of aid to
the progress, economic or otherwise, that has ensued from the flow of aid.
Key words: Foreign Aid, Ethiopia, Development
JEL Code: F3, H2
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I. Introduction
In 2005, the Gross Domestic Product of Ethiopia reached 74.5 billion Birr ($ 8.6 billion USD)1.
During the same year, the economy grew at 8.8% compared to previous year. In five years
(between 2000 and 2005), the economy added over 14 billion birr ($1.6 billion USD). At the
aggregate, this is significant improvement for a country with the frequent climate calamites and
poor infrastructure. Per capita wise, the same improvement may not be evident and Ethiopia
remains on the lower step of the ladder that helps climb the hill of development. With the
optimistic population estimate of 73 million people in 2005, the per capita income of the
country was 1020 birr ($117 USD) (IMF, 2006). This number is the lowest in the world in any
standard. Various explanations can be posed for the limited improvement (per capita wise) of
the economy ranging from liberalization (globalization) to population growth not only for
Ethiopia but also for similar economies around the world. Aid inflow has been advocated for as
one of the panaceas since 1950s, nevertheless, results of recent studies and reports is, at best,
mixed.

Along with the growth in the overall economy comes increased government spending and
deficit financing. The government collected about $2.3 billion dollars including taxes and
grants during 2004/2005 fiscal year. Out of which, $0.5 billion dollars (22%) was in the form
of grants. During the same year, the government spent $2.8 billion dollars and hence the
revenue, including grants, was short of total expenditure by $0.6 billion dollars. With out
grants the deficit could have been about $1 billion dollars. This makes the grant element of
government’s total expenditure 21% ($0.6/$2.8). Of the 22% external grant that constitute part
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of government revenue, 50% comes in the form of grants in kind (or earmarked) and the
remaining 50% comes in the form of untied cash (IMF, 2006).

How did the government finance the deficit? In principle, government could use both domestic
and external sources of finance that a country can tap to finance the deficit. What is relevant
for countries like Ethiopia is to finance deficits through hard currency since significant part of
the financing is required to cover expenses spent in hard currencies to import essential goods.
To this effect, external borrowing to finance the deficit accounts for 41% of total deficit during
2004/2005 fiscal year. The remaining sources of financing come from domestic borrowing and
privatization revenue2.

Overall, the country depends on external source of finance for about 29% of its total
government spending. As stated above, 19% comes in the form of budgetary support grant and
the remaining 10% comes as external borrowing. Arguments in favor of more grants than loans
seem to have been practiced in Ethiopia at least during the early 2000s. Aid in the form of
grant has been preferred over loans for several reasons (Rogoff, 2005, Bulow and Rogoff,
2005). Grantonly aid has been supported to prevent future debt crisis and to lift the tax burden
from the week economies of recipient countries. It is also argued that grantonly approach will
eliminate the “bad cop” role of development banks in enforcing debt payments. Clement and
et. al. (2004), on the other hand, despised the idea of grantonly aid due to its negative
implications on the collection of domestic revenue. Their study reveals that an increase in aid
inflow in the form of grant is associated with a decrease in domestic revenue collection, which
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eventually strain government budget. Both lines of arguments qualify their respective
conclusions with the need to enhance domestic institutions to respond to domestic revenue
collection capacities but also to improve transparency in the operation of governments.

Whether the sources of financing is something to worry about depends on who gives us the
grants, for what purposes they give us, when they give us, and whether we can count on them
at all times. If the sources are predictable and do not depend on regimes, one can plan
accordingly to make longterm plans. Otherwise, it is difficult to make progress in
development with sporadic flow of money now and then. It is important for the predictability
of the aid money to look at not only which countries account for the larger share of official
bilateral flows and which aid agencies account for the larger share of multilateral creditors but
also for what purposes the country has been receiving aid. Did they have preferences for any
particular regime over the other? Do the national interests of the donors affect the pattern of
aid flow into the country?

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to look into the profile of the aid flow in to the country
during 19602003. Special attention is given to the following questions. Who is giving when?
Who is giving for what purpose/sector? Who is giving and in what form? Whose aid support/
killed the agricultural sector of the country? The aim is to present a draft portrait of aid flow to
the country; no attempt is made to relate flows of aid to the performance of the economy, or no
attempt is made to show the effectiveness of the aid flow. The remaining sections are divided
as follows: the next chapter will present sources of data and methodology used in the paper,
section three background information, and data on the flow of aid to the country; sections four
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and five give detailed account of the major donors and sector distribution of aid, respectively;
the last section concludes the paper.

II. Data Sources and Methods

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has collected aid data
from its members through its Development Assistant Committee (DAC) and Creditors
Reporting System (CRS) questionnaires issued by the OECD secretariat. The data covers aid
flows from DAC member countries who were members in 2003. List of member countries are
indicated in appendix. The data on the geographic distribution of financial flows report for
each recipient country from each DAC member countries individually, and from multilateral
agencies from 1960 to 2003. Flows are grouped as loans, grants, technical cooperation, food
aid, private flows, and other official flows. The private flows mainly include export credits,
portfolio investments, and foreign direct investments. Both disbursement and commitment
information are reported for all categories. Actual disbursement amounts are used for the
analysis in this paper. This data set provides complete reporting from all donors (bilateral and
multilateral) to all the recipient countries (OECD, 2005). For the purpose of this paper, only
aid flow data for all donors to Ethiopia is employed.

Responses to the CRS questionnaire have sectoral distribution of only bilateral aid
commitments from 1973 to 2003. The sectors in this dataset refer to sectors of the recipient
countries and not the type of goods or services provided. For details on the description of the
sectors used in the reporting, refer to the appendix. Unlike the geographic distribution of
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financial flows data, the sectoral distribution data report incomplete inflrmation from the
donors. Some of the member countries report the sectoral distribution of the aid flow only
since 2002 (Greece and New Zealand). Data on technical cooperation by sector had not been
reported by some of the member countries (Germany, France, Japan, and Portugal). Some Aid
agencies of the United States prior to 1999 did not report their activities to the CRS. This
makes the coverage of CRS aid data less than 100%. The coverage ratio is 77% in 1995 but
improved overtime as countries started reporting sectoral allocation of their aid. The coverage
reached over 90% since 1999. This makes it difficult to compare this data set with the
geographic distribution data set described above. Obviously, the CRS data underestimates the
aid flow not only for each sector but also for the total inflow. Nevertheless, even with the
caveats, one can use this data as an approximation especially after 1999. In this paper, since
coverage ratio of multilateral aid distributions are low, only bilateral aid distributions are
employed.

The methods used to analysis the aid data are lowess, which is local regression smoothing, and
simply bar graphs. Lowess is derived from the term “locally weighted scatter plot smooth,” as
both methods use locally weighted linear regression to smooth data. The smoothing process is
considered local because each smoothed value is determined by neighboring data points
defined within the span. The process is weighted because a regression weight function is
defined for the data points contained within the span. Bar graphs are used to compare aid flows
by donors multilateral and bilateral – across regimes, sectors, and forms (type) of aid flows to
Ethiopia. Comparisons are made in terms of both average flows and total flows for each donor,
regime, sector, and forms of flows. With few exceptions, there is no variation in trends whether
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one looks into the average flows or the total flows for each donor for the geographic
distribution aid data. For the sectoral distribution data, since coverage ratios are less than
100%, only average aid flows are reported in all cases, for obvious reason that total aid inflows
would be misleading.

III. Background on Aid Flows and Donors

There is no doubt that Ethiopia has been and is being used as a poster child (for international
organizations, NGOs and recently rock bands) to generate aid money. Two famines that
devastated the northern part of the country in 1970s and 1980s that still resonates among the
public in the West prompted altruistic activities. The two worldwide music events (liveaid
and live8), to garner millions of aid money from official and private donors, made it clear that
aid money is not just to develop a country in the longrun but to save life that needs emergency
assistances. Credit goes to those who sponsored, organized, and contributed to those events to
help save life of those in need at the time of emergency. While providing urgent needs, the
country and international goodwishers should look across the horizon to provide sustainable
support mechanism for the people.

Various key reasons have been forwarded to explain the dismal nature of the economy. At the
same time alternatives mechanism have been suggested to tackle the problem once and for all.
Some commentators argue that restrictive religious practice is to blame for it forces the people
to stay home for almost half of the time during a given month. They went further to suggest
that the country needs not only additional support in the form of aid but also a new calendar
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(Wiedemann, 2005). While other question the longterm contribution of aid that comes into the
country. For instance, McLaughlin (2004) argues that because of the direct effect of food aid
from U.S. cookingoil industry in the Ethiopia had to shut down. There are other similar
anecdotes that highlight the need for more aid and at the same time the need for restraint on aid
to protect local economy.

There is also other concern with respect to aid flow: debt burden. As it is happening in other
part of the world, aid in the form of loan – in cash or in kind – has implications on debt crisis.
Although Ethiopia is not at an alarming rate with this regard, one needs to look into the current
state of the debt burden for reference purposes. As of 2005, the country owed over $6 billion
dollars to its creditors. Of this, 81% ($4.9 billion dollars) is owed to multilateral creditors, 13
% ($0.8 billion dollars) is owed to official bilateral donors and the remaining 5.9% is owed to
other commercial creditors. Of the multilateral creditors, International Development
Association (IDA), which is the World Bank group, accounts for about 70% of the debt stock;
whereas International Monetary Fund (IMF) accounts for only 3.4%. The African
Development Bank/Fund accounts for 22% of the debt stock. Paris Club member creditors
account for 29% of the total debt stock that the country owed to official bilateral creditors. The
remaining is owed to other official bilateral creditors. As one can see in the later sections,
current aid inflows include debt relief provided to Ethiopia under different programs. It is
important to keep this in mind to appreciate the significance of who is giving aid in the form of
debt relief and in the form of fresh aid inflow.
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There are previous studies that document the profile of debt burden of and aid flow to Ethiopia.
For instance, Alemayehu (2003) provides detailed account of the historic origin of Ethiopia’s
debt; Berhanu (2001) documents the level, source, and composition of aid flow into the
country; Yamano, et. al (2003) presents the role food aid in rural Ethiopia, whereas Maxwell
(1996) investigates the effectiveness of European aid to Ethiopia. Although the sprit of this
current study and previous studies is the same – to document the profile of aid flow, this study
not only uses latest and more detailed data but also presents aid flow by regime, type of aid and
purpose of aid that the country has been receiving since 1960.

Now let us turn to what has happened in terms of overall aid flow during the past four decades.
Average aid flow to the country reached its peak in early 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 1).
Increased trend in aid flow discontinued in mid 1990s and reached its trough point during the
years of EthioEritrea war (19972000). Similar trend applies when taking the sum of aid flows
over all forms of flows and over all multilateral donors. In terms of the average aid flow over
bilateral donors3, the same trend is observed albeit with less dramatic fluctuations during
regime changes and war times. Since 1985, the period for the onset of the devastating famine
of the 1980s, there had not been that much fluctuation in the aid flow from the bilateral donors,
both for the total and average aid flow during the study period. The exception was that there
was a jump in aid flow from bilateral donors in 2003. The surge in aid inflow for 2003 could
possible be in the form of emergency aid and food aid to respond to the 2002 drought. In 2002,
there was shortage of rain during the two harvest seasons  the Belg and the Mehr, which arrive
around February and June, respectively  withered over 70 percent of the maize and sorghum

3

Graph for the bilateral aid flow overtime is not presented in the paper to save space. Interested readers may
request from the author.

9

crops, decimating grain production. During the same year, Ethiopia produced 25 percent less
cereals and pulses than the previous year (FAO, 2003).
Figure 1: Average Aid Inflows by Year: 19602003

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
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1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

0

mean of aidm
.02
.04

.06

Aid inflow by Year over Flows: 19602003

Data Sourc e: OECD

The country has been receiving aid in various forms ranging from technical assistance to food
aid (Figure 2). Note that type of aid flow list all forms of capital inflows including market
based capital flows to the private sector. In the figure below, portfolio and FDI flows refer to
flows to the private sector; it should not be considered as aid to the private sector. During the
period from 1960 to 2003, Ethiopia received more aid flows in the form of ODA (Official
Development Assistance) grant followed by ODA loan. Aid in the form of technical
cooperation and food aid took the third and the fourth places, respectively. The remaining aid
flows were directed to the private sector. Taking the average flows, the same ranking can be
observed, except that flows in the form of technical cooperation dropped below flows to the
private sector (including export credits and contractual lending) and food aid (Figure 2). It can
easily be seen that flows in the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are
at the bottom of the list for the period under consideration. This is not unexpected for Ethiopia,
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as the country’s economy has not been performing that well to attract private capital and
market based loans.

Figure 2: Average Aid Inflows by Type of Aid: 19602003
Aid inflow by Type of Flow: 19602003
ODA Grant
ODA Loan
To Private
Food A id
Technical Coop.
Portf olio
FDI

0

.01

.02
.03
mean of aidm

.04

.05

Data Source: OECD

Figure 3 indicates major multilateral donors during the period 19602003. EU, followed by the
World Bank and World Food Program, were the major multilateral donors. The other two
multilateral agencies were Africa (African Development Bank and African Development Fund)
and World Food Program (Figure 3). Similar pattern can be observed if one takes either the
average aid or the total aid flow over donors during the period 19602003. Given frequent
droughts followed by famine, the importance of aid from World Food Program is not
surprising for the case of Ethiopia. It is also important to note that 15 of the 22 DAC member
countries belong to EU and they share as a group is expected to be high. It provides the sum of
individual EU member countries.
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Figure 3: Average Inflows by Multilateral Donors: 19602003
Aid inflow by Multilateral Donors: 19602003
European Union
World Bank
World Food Program
A fric a
UN Agencies
IMF
Intern. Fund f or A gri. Dev lop.
A rab Agencies
Nordic Dev elopment Fund
International Financ e Co.
Montreal Protocol
InterA merican
A sia

0

.05

.1

.15

mean of aidm
Data Source: OECD

Among the bilateral donors, U.S., Italy, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands took the top
position in that order during the study period. This is true for both the total aid flow and the
average aid flow (Figure 4). The role of Italy is obvious given the historical ties of the two
countries, especially until Eritrea split from Ethiopia in 1993. The role of U.S in supporting
Ethiopia was significant during the 1960s and early 1970s until the Derg had taken power from
the imperial regime. Recently, the relationship between U.S and Ethiopia seem to be more than
ever for various reasons (more on this later). The humanitarian and development contributions
of other European countries, including German, Sweden and, to some extent, the Netherland,
are easy to notice in Ethiopia, especially their support for local governmental and non
governmental organizations and for infrastructure development.

Having identified the major forms of flow, the major donors and the overall trend of aid flow
into Ethiopia during 19602003, now let us turn to the details of the flow, particularly who has
been giving in what form and during which regime.
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Figure 4: Average Aid Inflow by Bilateral Donors: 19602003
Aid inflow by Bilateral Donors: 19602003
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Data Sourc e: OECD

IV. Who was giving when and what?
Aid inflows by Regime
Regime here refers to the different governments who came to power by involuntarily
overthrow of governments that preceding each regime. In the case of Ethiopia, three regimes
can be observed based on the availability of data from 19602003. The three regimes are
Imperial regime (19601973), Military (Derg) regime (19741990) and the current regime
(19912003). It is important to note that Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until 1993; hence, the data
have not been adjusted for that at least until 1990. This may overestimate the aid flow to
Ethiopia, this is especially true for the first two regimes, as some commentators claim, since
significant share of the aid money have been invested or spent on Eritrea to appease the then
guerilla fighters and the current leaders of Eritrea.
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As one can expect, the imperial regime received the least total (and average) aid flows
compared to the other two regimes. At least two reasons account for this. Internationally, pre
1970 was the period when cold war was not the major factor for countries to help others
through aid to attract them to their camp. The second reason for the invisible flow of aid to the
country was due to the decision by the regime of Ethiopia at that time to hide from
international media attention the drought and famine that had swept the northern part of the
country.

Figure 5: Average Aid Inflows by Types of Flow over Regimes
19601973
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Foreign A id by Flow s over Regimes, Data source: OECD

Hence, although food aid accounts for significant share during the last two regimes, it was at
the bottom during the imperial regime (Figure 5). For the last two regimes, average aid money
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in the form of ODA grant tops the list. For the first regime, capital flow to the private sector
came first. In terms of total aid money4, Aid in the form of technical cooperation ranks second
for the first two regimes where as ODA loan was second for the current regime. Given the
current government’s willingness to adopt reform policies in line with the Washington
consensus, aid money in the form of loan is easily forthcoming. As stated above, for the last
two regimes, aid in the form of food aid takes the fourth place where as aid flows to private
sectors were at the bottom of the list for the last two regimes. There are some differences
between the average and the total aid flow during the period under consideration. One of the
surprises is that aid money that went to the private sector (contractual lending and export
credits) jumped to the top of the list for the imperial regime, and came second in the list
(following ODA grant) during the military regime where as it came third for the current regime
following ODA grant and ODA loan (Figure 5). It is surprising to the see aid money for the
private sector during the military regime, which is a staunch supporter of command economy
that advocates for the state control of the economic machinery.

In terms of major multilateral donors during each regime, EU, UN agencies, the World Bank,
World Food Program, and African Development Bank/Fund top the list irrespective of regime
change. EU was at the top of the list in terms of total aid flow followed by UN agencies and the
World Bank for the first two regimes where as for the current regime World Bank comes
second. Similar pattern can be observed for the average aid flow, except that for all the three
regimes the World Bank came closer to the top of the list (Figure 6). If history is any guide,
looking at the average aid inflow, the aid money that is coming through the World Bank and

4

Graph for the total aid flow is not presented in the paper to save space.

15

the private sector seem to be predictable and consistent throughout the period of study (more
on this in the later sections).

Figure 6: Average Aid Inflows by Multilateral Donors over Regimes
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European Union
World Bank
Africa
UN Agencies
World Food Program
Nordic Development Fund
Montreal Protocol
International Finance Co.
Intern. Fund for Agri. Devlop.
InterAmerican
IMF
Asia
Arab Agencies

19741990
European Union
World Bank
World Food Program
Africa
UN Agencies
IMF
Intern. Fund for Agri. Devlop.
Arab Agencies
Nordic Development Fund
Montreal Protocol
International Finance Co.
InterAmerican
Asia

0

.05 .1 .15

0

19912003
World Bank
European Union
World Food Program
Africa
UN Agencies
Nordic Development Fund
Intern. Fund for Agri. Devlop.
Arab Agencies
Montreal Protocol
International Finance Co.
InterAmerican
IMF
Asia

.05 .1 .15

Total
European Union
World Bank
World Food Program
Africa
UN Agencies
IMF
Intern. Fund for Agri. Devlop.
Nordic Development Fund
Arab Agencies
Montreal Protocol
International Finance Co.
InterAmerican
Asia

0

.05 .1 .15

0

.05 .1 .15

mean of aidm
Foreign Aid by Multilateral Donors and Regime, Data Source: OECD

Regarding bilateral donors, as indicated in the previous section, five countries still top the list
of bilateral donors during the three regimes of Ethiopia. These countries are U.S, Sweden,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Looking at the bilateral donors in each regime, the role
that U.K, Japan, and Canada play becomes noticeable. While still U.S. holds the top position as
a major bilateral donor during the first and the last regimes, Italy took the top rank for the its
aid money flow during the military regime. One needs to consider the role of Eritrea when
looking at the contributions of Italy. The military regime – the period when Italy tops the list
16

is the period when Eritrea was part of Ethiopia, and Italy seems to have interest in the country
as its citizens and economic interests were at stake at that time. During the current regime, the
aid money coming from Italy dropped down to sixth place in the list (Figure 7). Sweden
follows U.S. in its average aid flows to Ethiopia during the imperial regime. The country was
at third place, following Italy and U.S., during the military regime, whereas its average aid
placed Sweden even below Japan at the fifth place during 19912003. One of the features of
aid money from Sweden (and for that matter for most Scandinavian countries) is that the
country often give aid for humanitarian purposes and during the first two regimes when aid
money was not forthcoming from other sources, Sweden was providing aid under both
regimes. Canada and U.K. surpassed the Netherlands in terms of the average aid flow to the
country during the military regime (for the case of Canada) and during the first two regimes for
the case of U.K. For the current regime, Japan took the fourth spot surpassing Sweden and
Italy, which had been in the top four for the past two regimes.

For the current regime, the good news is that other bilateral donors have been entering the list
and made significant contributions in terms of average aid inflow, at least compared to the
imperial regime. These countries are Norway, Canada, Ireland, France, Finland, Belgium,
Switzerland, Australia, Denmark, and Austria. It is good news not just for the current regime
but also for the country as a whole since the list is dominated by Scandinavian countries whose
aid often times destined for humanitarian purposes rather than to achieve donor country
national interests, as it is alleged for the other western donor countries.
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Figure 7: Average Aid Inflows by Bilateral Donors over Regimes
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Who was giving in what form?

In previous sections, it has been noted that the major bilateral donors and the different forms in
which the country has been receiving aid. Now let us see the break down of forms by which the
aid money has been coming and which countries gave in what form. The focus is on those
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major donors (U.S., Canada, Japan, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and U.K.) and
the recent additions to the list especially after the overthrow of the military regime (Norway,
Australia, France, and Ireland). Almost all major donors gave aid in the form of ODA grant as
their major means. It is no a surprise that for the major crop producing countries like Canada,
U.K., Norway, and U.S (countries that support their agricultural sector); food aid was their next
best means to hand in aid. Cline indicates that during the period 20002002, on average,
outputdistorting subsidies as percent of agricultural output were 19.9% for U.S., 1.65% for
Canada, and 36.2% for European Union (Cline, 2004). It is important to note that food aid, as it
is presented here, does not include emergency and relief food delivered during the times of
distress in the country. The food aid listed here is categorized as aid under program assistance.
If one adds food aid under program assistance and that listed under emergency and relief, the
proportion would have been much higher for these countries.

Aid in the form of technical cooperation comes next to ODA grant for Sweden, Japan, the
Netherlands, Germany, and France. For the other major donors, aid in the form of technical
assistance ranks third following grant and food aid. The world’s biggest economies – U.S,
Germany, and Japan also gave significant amount of development loans to Ethiopia (Figure
8). It seems that, for most of the countries, during the study period aid came in kind – food aid
and technical cooperation than in cash. Aid in kind comes with its shortcomings. First, the aid
may help particular sector, which may not be the priority of the country, probably the country
might want to have cash to buy food from surplus producing regions of the country rather than
receiving food in kind. The same issue can be raised for the case of technical cooperation, for
instance in the form of training, which may help sectors that may not be at the priority of the
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countries development agenda. Second, it is also the case that aid received in kind may end up
being sold in backdoor markets and the proceeds may be embezzled by officials. The same
problem can also be raised for the case of aid in cash; however, in the case of food aid the
targeted recipients live in remote places, and it is difficult to track down whether they have
actually received the food intended for them and how that affects the rural economy. For
instance, see Zhang, 2004 for the likely effects of food aid on the local and international food
markets. Technical cooperation seems better in this regard since the purpose is to increase the
skill (human capital) level and the physical capital stock in the country, which can be easily
verifiable.
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Figure 8: Average Aid Inflows Type of Flows over Bilateral Donors
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Predictability and sustainability of aid flow is crucial for countries like Ethiopia that are
dependent on aid to finance deficits, to emergency relief, and to build infrastructure. To get the
feel of predictability and sustainability, smoothed trends of aid flow over time for each donor
(bilateral and multilateral) is presented below in Figures 9, 10, and 11.
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Lowess, local regression smoothing, is used to the present smoothed trends in the flows of aid
by bilateral donors (Figure 9), multilateral donors (Figure 10), and forms/types of flow (Figure
11). The smoothed trends show how the respective donors change their aid flow overtime.
Most bilateral donors’ aid flow is almost flat during 19602003 except for U.S, Ireland,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, and Sweden. Continuous increase in aid flow is observed
for U.S, Ireland, Netherlands, and, to some extent, Japan. While others, like Italy, Germany,
and Sweden registered a downward trend in recent years; U.S, Ireland, U.K, the Netherlands,
and Japan, had an upward trend during the early 2000s. As indicated in the overall trend for all
countries, the recent decline in the aid flow has to do with the recent border conflict and war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. For the later countries, mainly U.S., the Netherlands, and U.K,
that did not deter them from sending more aid to Ethiopia. Aid inflows from multilateral
donors were also flat except for the flows from the World Bank, African Development
Bank/Fund, World Food Program, and EU (Figure 10). The flows from the World Bank echoes
that of the U.S with its continuous flow even for recent years. For the other donors, Africa, EU
and World Food Program, the aid flow picked in early 1990s then slid back to its historic
average during recent years echoing the trends of some European countries including Italy,
Germany and Sweden. From the above two smoothed trends predictability is not forthcoming
for all countries. It is not that all countries increase or decrease their aid flow at one time. Some
donors increase during one period, while other increase during other periods. Does this imply
national interest of donors not the socioeconomic milieu of the country? It can also be due to
division of labor among donors, where some donors give only for humanitarian needs at times
of crisis while others give for projects and for longterm development programs (EU and the
World Bank). Predictability of the later is important, nevertheless, even for the major donors,
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like EU, sustainability seem not something that the country can count on as one can see from
the decline in aid flow from EU in recent years.

Figure 9: Lowess Smoothing of Average Aid Inflows over Type of Flows: 19601003
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Figure 10: Lowess Smoothing of Average Aid Inflows over Bilateral Donors: 19602003
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There is something to rejoice though, all the major forms/types of capital inflows show
increasing trend, especially in recent years. Flows to the private sector (FDI, Portfolio, and
other private) and in the form of Official Development Assistances (both grants and loans)
were pouring in at increasing rate in recent years. The other major forms of aid flow  Food
Aid and Technical Cooperation registered an increased flow although at a decreasing rate
(Figure 11). This looks a healthy sign for emerging economy where official aid flows are
replaced by private capital flows. However, for a country like Ethiopia where the capital
market is not well developed (or none existent) and where the effect of the aid flow has been
just started to be felt in most rural parts of the country, it is too early to expect the role of
private capital flows to play significant role in the country. It may be unhealthy if the rate of
infrastructure development lags behind that of the private capital flow. It is important to note
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here that the private capital flows are just a recent phenomenon. If one can check back Figure 2
that presents average aid flow by type of flow, compared to other forms of capital flow, flows
to the private sector are at the bottom of the list. This seems an expected outcome where flow
of money to the private sector is waiting for the effect of development grants and loans to be
felt across the interlinked sectors of the economy.

Figure 11: Lowess smoothing of Average Aid Inflows over Multilateral Donors: 19602003
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V. Distribution of Aid by Sector/Purpose: 19732003
The OECD dataset also compiled information on aid flow by purpose or sectoral distribution.
Since the data reported for each donor and for each year are not complete, only average aid
flows are used for discussion purposes in this part of the study. The major sectors/purposes
used in the OECD dataset are described in the Appendix. The sectors are social infrastructure
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and services, economic infrastructure and services, production sectors, emergency assistance,
help with debt, multisector, program assistance, and unallocated/unspecified. According to the
definition of OECD, these sectors can be grouped into two: aid for (direct) production activities
(including infrastructure and services) and aid for nonproductive (including emergency
assistances). Productive activities include allocation of aid to social and economic
infrastructure and service, production sectors, and multisectors. Nonproductive activities
include aid flows to program assistances as well as emergency assistances, which mainly refer
to food aid, and help with aid. As one can see from figure 12, during the period 19732003,
large sum of aid money went to the nonproductive activities, mainly program and emergency
assistances and help with aid. The exception is that the fund that was destined for social
infrastructure and services was in the middle of the top lists. On average basis, considering all
donors, aid allocations to almost all directly productive sectors were at the bottom of the list.

It is worthy of the time and space to talk more about one of the nonproductive purposes for
which the country received during this period: Help with debt. It seems that help with the debt
initiatives got much publicity after the 1996 HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative
by the World Bank and IMF; later followed by similar initiative after the Gleneagles summit in
July 2005. The objective of both initiatives is to cancel all or most of the debt owed by poor
countries of the world. Ethiopia has been benefiting from both initiatives, but what is relevant
for the period study is the HIPC initiatives. The initiative sounds and looks convincing and
altruistic from donors and recipients point of view in that it relieves poor countries from debt
services that they could not manage to pay now. Developing countries scholars and
commentators, however, immediately raised question regarding the initiatives. One concern
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that keeps coming is that debt relief may end up being a substitute for additional aid. Donors
who consider debt cancellation may not plan to extend fresh grants or loans, but poor countries,
despite accumulated debt, still needs more grants and/or loans to finance their deficits or
development projects (Arslanalp and Henry, 2006; Rogoff, 2005). Hence, it may be to early to
count on the debt relief component of aid unless fresh aid money keeps coming at a sustainable
rate and magnitude.

Figure 12: Average Aid Inflows by Sectors: 19732003
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Sectoral Distribution of Aid by Regime

Only the last two regimes are considered for the sectoral distribution aid money since the data
starts in 1973. The sectoral distribution of aid money for the current regime echoes that of the
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total allocation in that aid money mainly went to nonproductive activities with the exception
of aid for the social infrastructure and service sector. It is surprising to see that the military
regime received more money for productive sector than the current regime, despite the buzz
about the extensive infrastructure development during the current regime. One can argue that
although the aid statistics shows that the country had received aid money for productive
activities during the military regime, some of that money might have been diverted to other
nonproductive sector and resulted in the debt burden. It is also important to note that during
both regimes, program assistance was one of the main aid recipient sectors, which mainly was
in the form of food aid (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Average Aid Inflows by Sectors over Regimes
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Sectoral Distribution of Aid inflow by Bilateral Donors
Which donors gave for productive sectors and which ones gave for nonproductive activities?
The draft description here echoes that of the preceding discussion where countries ranked by
the type/method of aid (Figure 8). Figure 14 illustrates rank of donor countries under each
sector. Countries that top the rank of aid flow to the emergency and program assistance are
those listed as major food aid donors including the U.S, U.K, Norway, Canada, Germany,
Sweden, and Japan. When it comes to emergency assistance, U.S and UK are at the top as they
have the largest Ethiopian diaspora living in their country, and it is politically correct for the
world powers to respond to emergency needs. Italy and Germany, in addition to their aid
money that went to help with debt, also rank at the top for their aid flows to the production
sector and economic infrastructure and services (following Japan). Flow of aid to the social
infrastructure and services sector is toped by U.S followed by Germany, Sweden, and Ireland.
The figure further shows that, in terms of magnitude, Ethiopia received more aid money for
emergency assistance from U.S than any other country and to any other sector during the three
decades. Following that aid money went to help with debt and to program assistance, all of
which, except perhaps program assistance, are not directly productive sectors.
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Figure 14: Average Aid Inflows by Bilateral Donors over Sectors: 19732003
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The overall trend of aid flow to the major sectors is reported in Figure 15. The figure presents
local regression smoothing trend during the last three decades. Aid flows to two of the
productive sectors (economic infrastructure, and production) have been flat. Flows to the social
infrastructure and multisector activities registered modest increases in recent years. Significant
jumps in aid flow have been recorded for emergency assistance. Aid flows to program
assistance has also jumped during early 1990s and remained stable since then. Help with debt
has also jumped during late 1990s, however, it retuned to its historic average in recent years.

Figure 15: Lowess Smoothing of Average Aid Inflows over Sectors: 19732003
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V. Conclusions
The main trust of this study is to present profile of aid inflow to Ethiopia. Attempt is made to
document the aid inflow from bilateral and multilateral donors by type/method of flow during
the past four decades (19602003) as well as aid flow from bilateral donors by purpose/sector
during the last three decades (19732003). Geographic and Sectoral aid distribution data made
available by OECD has been employed to document the profile. For each of these the aid flows
variation by regime is also reported.

It is documented that major bilateral donor countries are U.S, Italy, Germany, Sweden,
Netherlands, Japan, and UK. European Union, World Bank, World Food Program, and African
Development Bank/Fund top the rank of major multilateral donors. Aid money came into the
country mainly through Official Development Assistance (both in the form of grant and loan)
followed by flows to the private sector (export credit and lending) and food aid, on average
basis during 19602003. There is an upward trend in aid inflow in the form of foreign direct
investment, portfolio, and flows through other private means. It is important to note that there
were significant variations in aid flow across regimes in terms of the donors and the
type/method that aid money have been delivered.

The major sectors that received the largest aid money during the last three regimes were
program and emergency assistances (mainly food aid), social and infrastructure and services,
and help with debt. There has also been significant variation across regimes and donors in
terms of which sectors received the largest aid money. In recent years, emergency assistance
and social infrastructure has been receiving aid at an increasing rate. Whereas other sectors,
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like economic infrastructure, production sector, and multisector have received aid at a
declining rate. Perhaps it is normal to expect the inflow of private capital into the productive
sectors by the time the effects of the flow of aid money to the social infrastructure development
are being felt nationwide.
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Appendix: Data
Economic Sectors reported in CRS aid data (taken from OECD International Development
Statistics, CDROM 2005 Edition)
Social Infrastructure and Services: This category covers efforts to develop the human resource potential and
ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries. It includes, but not exhausted by, the following sectors.
Education
Health and Population
Water Supply, Sanitation and Sewerage (excludes irrigation systems for agriculture).
Economic Infrastructure and Services: This category covers assistance for networks, utilities, and services that
facilitate economic activity. It includes, but not exhausted by, the following sectors.
Energy
Transportation and Communications
Production Sectors: This category covers contributions to all directly productive sectors. It comprises:
Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry
Industry, Mining & Construction
Trade & Tourism
Multisector: support for projects, which straddle several sectors, with a concentration on the environment,
gender projects and urban and rural development
Program Assistance: all general developmental contributions other than debt reorganization, made available with
no preimposed sector allocation, e.g., balance of payments and budget support and funds made available for
capital projects at the recipient's choice, but not subject to agreement by the donor. This item includes in
particular, sector unallocated structural adjustment assistance. It Includes:
Food Aid: supplies of food under bilateral programs
Action Relating to Debt: debt forgiveness, rescheduling, refinancing, etc
Emergency Assistance: emergency and distress relief in cash or in kind. It includes
Relief food aid
Aid to refugees
Unallocated/Unspecified: aid that cannot be assigned to another part of aid flow, and in the case of project or
sector assistance, commitments for which the sectoral destination had not been specified. Includes aid to
Nongovernmental organizations
Administrative costs
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Definition of the terms used in the data sets
Grants: this heading covers transfers, in money or in kind, for which no repayment is required. It
includes grants for technical cooperation, grantlike flows, i.e., loans extended by governments or official
agencies in currencies of the donor countries but repayable in recipients' currencies and transfer of resources
through sales of commodities for recipients' currencies, less local currency balances used by the donor for other
than development purposes (for example, to defray the local costs of embassy operations).
The following are excluded: reparations and indemnification payments to private individuals, insurance and
similar payments to residents of developing countries, and loans extended in and repayable in recipients'
currencies.
Multilateral Agencies: the list of multilateral agencies for which data are shown separately in this report is given
in the Introduction. To the extent possible, a distinction has been made between concessional and non
concessional flows from multilateral agencies. Loan disbursements for which it was not possible to make this
distinction on a transactionbytransaction basis have been treated as nonconcessional if made from "ordinary
capital'' resources and as concessional if made from a "soft window''. Thus, for some agencies "total loans'' are
significantly larger than loans on concessional terms, and the volume of loans on concessional terms actually
received by the borrowing country may not be accurately measured.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and
multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive
agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests:
i) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of
developing countries as its main objective; and
ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent.
ODA Loans: loans with maturities of over one year and meeting the criteria set under ODA, extended by
governments or official agencies, and for which repayment is required in convertible currencies or in kind.
Rescheduling (maturity extension of loans originally made by a government or official agency) and loans made by
a government or an official agency to refinance indebtedness due to the private or official sector, are included if
reported as Official Development Assistance or Official Aid. The net data are reported after deduction of
amortization payments and the impact of other measures reducing debt (e.g.forgiveness).
Technical Cooperation: This is defined as activities whose primary purpose is to augment the level of
knowledge, skills, technical knowhow or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries, i.e.,
increasing their stock of human intellectual capital, or their capacity for more effective use of their existing factor
endowment. Accordingly, the figures relate mainly to activities involving the supply of human resources
(teachers, volunteers, experts in various sectors) and action targeted on human resources (education, training,
advice).
Private Sector Flows: is broken down into direct investment, portfolio investment, and export credits (net). The
transactions covered are those undertaken by residents of DAC Member countries. Portfolio investment
corresponds to bonds and equities. In the text, flows to the private sector is divided into three: foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment and other private flows (including export credits, contractual leadings).
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LIST OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS
Members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Australia
Austria (EU)
Belgium (EU)
Canada
Denmark (EU)
Finland (EU)
France (EU)
Germany (EU)
Greece (EU)
Ireland (EU)
Italy (EU)
Japan
Luxembourg (EU)
Netherlands (EU)
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal (EU)
Spain (EU)
Sweden (EU)
Switzerland
United Kingdom (EU)
United States
Multilateral Organizations
Africa
AfDB African Development Bank
AfDF African Development Fund
Asia
AsDB Asian Development Bank
AsDB Asian Development Bank Special Funds
UN Agencies
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTA United Nations Regular Program of Technical Assistance
WFP World Food Program
ARAB AGENCIES Arab Agencies
IMF International Monetary Fund
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The World Bank
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
NDF Nordic Development Fund
IDB InterAmerican Development Bank
Montreal Protocol
IFC International Finance Corporation
EU European Union
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